

## Politics is Really Other Things

by Edward Bernard Glick ©1999

*Editor's note: According to German philosopher and general Carl von Clausewitz, war carries out policy by other means. Therefore, what Glick says about political scientists also applies to those who study and fight wars.*

No matter how political scientists define themselves, most of what people call "political" originates and gets its character, intractability and unsolvability from branches of knowledge outside of politics. Political scientists must learn philosophy, art, literature, languages, history, geography, demography, psychology, economics, sociology, anthropology and even physics, chemistry and biology. They must also learn how and to what extent other disciplines affect their own.

Can one be a good political scientist or politician without knowing which historical, geographic, economic, social, psychological and cultural factors trigger which actions and reactions between governors and governed? Can one be a good student of diplomacy or be a diplomat without realizing that it is not enough to know only foreign languages, international law and political and military strategy? One must understand negotiators' thinking and feelings as well as those of the people for which negotiations are being conducted.

Can one be a good student or negotiator of arms control without knowing the physical characteristics of the weapons of mass destruction and of the delivery systems that are to be controlled or eliminated or the fears and distrusts of the peoples and countries who amassed the weapons and systems in the first place? And, so far as the profession of arms is concerned, can one be a successful military officer, especially in the higher ranks, without amassing great knowledge and insight about the civil

part of the civil-military equation in a democratic society?

### Symbiosis

The symbiosis between politics and nonpolitics operates in both directions. For example, what would happen if the president of the United States were to die suddenly? If his death is a natural one, its cause is biological. If it is accidental, such as resulting from the crash of Air Force One, its cause might be the pilot's violation of the laws of aerodynamics. If he commits suicide, then psychology and psychiatry are key factors. And, if he is assassinated, the causal mixture involves, at the very least, criminology, ideology and politics.

Regardless of the circumstance, the president's death would produce immediate political and nonpolitical consequences. Stock markets would fall. So, too, would the value of the US dollar. Tourists would be afraid to travel. Investors would fear to invest. Consumers would put off purchases. Domestic programs would falter. Foreign wars would start or stop. And, the president's successor would bring his own persona, proclivities, priorities and policies to the Oval Office and to the nation.

### Political Actualization

Politics *is* an important aspect of the human condition, and political science *is* an important academic discipline. But problems only become "political" when and because a society is unable to handle them in the cultural, religious, economic, historical or other arena of human activity or when and because pressures from elsewhere push them across the "line of political actualization."

Take zoning, as an example. For the most part, zoning involves localized, low-level administrative or legal decisions on such issues as whether and where a service station,

shopping center, or housing development should or should not be built in a particular place and time. Zoning decisions rarely receive statewide or national attention. However, they become highly visible, very political and widely known when used to keep Blacks from living next to Whites, Jews from living next to Christians or poor people from living next to rich ones. But, if the other sciences had discovered and disseminated the means of erasing racism, anti-Semitism and socioeconomic snobbery in the first place, would the US have highly politicized zoning problems in the second place?

If years ago, automakers had built safer and more pollution-free cars; if the pharmaceutical industry had made sure its products were always safe and efficacious before putting them on the market; if toymakers and paintmakers had made certain their products were lead-free; and if chemical, mining and power companies had not dumped billions of tons of toxicity into our lands and waters, would there be a need for such government entities as the Environmental Protection Agency, the Federal Trade Commission or the Food and Drug Administration?

### Being an Interdisciplinary

Since most university professors do not acquire or share knowledge in an interdisciplinary manner, most university students also do not. One student was having difficulty focusing his graduate paper on French policy toward the US and Britain during the post-World War II leadership of French President Charles DeGaulle. I told him that, while grateful to the Allies for defeating Nazi Germany, DeGaulle resented the ensuing loss of French power and glory, even as he resented what he derisively called "Anglo-Saxon hegemony."

US President Franklin D. Roosevelt disliked and distrusted DeGaulle. English Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill lamented that of all the crosses he had to bear, the heaviest one was the Cross of Lorraine—Joan of Arc's emblem—which DeGaulle adopted for the Free French movement.

To understand the subject, the student needed to understand that personal relationships underlie political relationships. Therefore, he would need to read historical and psychological materials about the interactions of Roosevelt, Churchill and DeGaulle. To understand political science, he needed to learn history, psychology and so on.

### Academic Eclecticism

Despite what specialists might think of other fields, knowing something about them is helpful. Of course, historians use their stuff in their way and psychologists in theirs. But does that mean political scientists cannot use them too, whenever they understand them and find them relevant to their pursuits? Is there a

law against academic eclecticism?

Renato Baserga, the chair of pathology at the medical school of Temple University in the 1970s, wrote: "I started out as a pathologist doing classical morphology. Then I studied nuclear physics so I could better understand radiation, autoradiography and problems of that kind. I studied mathematics to understand patterns of cell growth. After these avenues were exhausted in the sense [that] they were not giving me any more information, I switched to biochemistry. Right now I am even doing some immunology because some of the problems in which we are interested require immunological techniques. There is an advantage in many different disciplines. My medical background has given me the perspective on how to pick a problem. A more rigorous scientific training has given me the tools to try to solve the problem."<sup>1</sup>

Like Baserga, the best medical professors do not consider their specialties and subspecialties to be sacredly separate. They stress interrelationships. They teach that people

are whole beings, not limbs and livers, eyes and ears, or heads and hands. And their best pupils—the ones who go on to become the best doctors—remember this.

Somehow, those of us who teach, and those of us who study, political science must take a similar interdisciplinary approach. Otherwise, the public, the press and the political class will relegate us all to an irrelevance that we would well deserve. **MR**

### NOTES

1. Renato Baserga and David T. Denhardt, eds., *Anti-Sense Strategies* (New York: New York Academy of Sciences, 1992).

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## US Army Europe: Deployment Training and Certification

by Colonel Robert J. Fulcher Jr., US Army

Military convoys no longer grind their way to or from the Grafenwoehr training area in Germany. Guns no longer relentlessly pound Grafenwoehr impact areas 24 hours a day. Social, political, economic and environmental factors have eliminated yearly REFORGER exercises. The US Army is now largely based in the Continental United States (CONUS). However, as the Army's forward-deployed component, US Army Europe (USAREUR) is ideally suited to support the National Command Authority's strategy of shaping and engagement.

USAREUR has become an innovator in the processes necessary to prepare a force for military operations other than war (MOOTW). Nowhere is that innovation as apparent as the training plan used to prepare forces for duty in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and the NATO-led mission in Bosnia. USAREUR/7th Army's (7A's)

success in preparing forces for MOOTW missions results from the application of a simple, yet effective, six-step model adopted by follow-on forces in CONUS.

**Step 1. Training the force to fill mission essential task list (METL) proficiency.** USAREUR/7A calls this step "training the delta," and it does not relate directly to an impending MOOTW mission. The intent is to bring MOOTW-mission units to full METL proficiency in their conventional mission skills.

The obvious question is why train a unit to a high state of readiness in skills not directly related to the upcoming mission? The answer is simple. There is no guarantee that tasked units will not be pulled from their MOOTW mission to respond to other, higher priority missions that would require proficiency in the skills normally ascribed to the units. The units might also have to transition to conventional military opera-

tions within the theater of employment. The time to pull units into neutral areas or the resources necessary to train them might not exist. For these reasons each unit must be capable of fulfilling its habitual assigned role. Obviously this step depends heavily on the most scarce resource in Army operations—time.

**Step 2. Form the team.** MOOTW missions require a highly tailored team designed to be effective given the mission's unique requirements. The team USAREUR/7A formed to provide a possible response force in Zaire was different from the force sent to the Balkans as part of the NATO-led peacekeeping force.

USAREUR/7A's team will often be a joint team and most certainly will have a combined component. Such a team will most likely comprise a mix of active and reserve forces, and it will be unique in its mix of mission and support personnel. Bringing the team together early in the process

helps ensure mission success.

**Step 3. Assess mission-training requirements.** To provide structure to the assessment, USAREUR/7A divides the assessment into three levels: individual skills, collective or unit skills and leader skills. Within the individual and collective categories, USAREUR/7A has further divided the analysis into general skills associated with the individual or unit and theater-specific skills unique to the mission or environment. The assessment is published in the training annex of the theater campaign plan.

**Step 4. Training tasks identified in the assessment.** Standards must first be developed. This is where the expertise found at the 7A's Training Command's Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) was employed with great success. The observer-controller teams assigned to CMTC were ideally suited to develop and maintain the programs of instruction necessary to ensure standardization.

To be effective, the first component of training must be leader training. Leader training is a full orientation to the mission and environment, gives key command and staff members in-depth knowledge of the mission and allows leaders to focus on follow-on training. People intimately aware of mission requirements and the environment conduct leader training in seminar format.

The first leaders' seminar was conducted at the Grafenwoehr training area by USAREUR/7A staff. General Sir Michael Rose's experience leading the Canadian peacekeeping mission provided the necessary focus to leaders of the first USAREUR deploying forces. USAREUR/7A using current Task Force EAGLE staff conducted subsequent seminars.

*Leaders' seminar.* The leaders' seminar provides a great opportunity to combine leaders, a scenario and computer simulations. The master events list team creates a unique environment for leaders to implement training doctrine on the battlefield without using major training resources.

This capstone exercise provides the training required for units that are getting ready to deploy. In the past, the leaders' seminar has been an invaluable tool for improving the over-

all readiness for deployment to any contingency around the world. This seminar also polishes existing skills and enhances leader development at higher collective levels through competitive, force-on-force, METL-specific and high-intensity operations.

*Individual replacement training (IRT).* IRT is designed to train USAREUR/7A military and civilian individual replacements deploying for duty in Hungary, Croatia or Bosnia in support of Operation *Joint Forge*. Department of Defense (DOD) Level 1, category 2, Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP) training and the area of operations brief are prerequisites for deployment.

The CMTC in Hohenfels, Germany, was solely responsible for training individual replacements in CONUS and USAREUR/7A. As CMTC resumed its doctrinal mission of training US and allied units in maneuver operations, a program had to be developed to give units more responsibility for IRT.

On 1 July 1998, a new IRT program replaced the old "all-inclusive" 3-day program. The new program consists of two phases. Phase I is conducted at the individual's unit. The unit commander develops a training plan using a training support package (TSP) developed by CMTC and the 7th Air Training Command (ATC). The TSP consists of video instruction shot by CMTC and available at local training and audiovisual support centers and text material available for download from the 7th ATC. Phase II consists of situational training exercise (STX) lanes where personnel can employ the skills they have learned.

The training an individual receives for deployment depends on his duty status and where he is going in support of Operation *Joint Forge*. All personnel must receive DOD AT/FP training within 6 months of movement downrange. Personnel visiting Operation *Joint Forge* as authorized visitors in a temporary duty status do not require further training. Personnel deploying to temporary change of station locations outside of the Multi-National Division footprint in Bosnia train on only the core tasks in Phase I. Personnel deploying to Bosnia train on all tasks in the TSP,

then conduct one-day STX lanes.

The STX lanes are conducted by the individual's major support command or, as an alternate, by the CMTC in Hohenfels. The STX lane uses scenarios and role playing that allow individuals to apply what they have learned in Phase I to situations such as reacting to a minefield, reacting to direct and indirect fire, running a checkpoint and so on.

The new IRT program ensures individuals are prepared for the risks that might arise during deployment with Operation *Joint Forge* and gives commanders more control over their training and the release resources needed for CMTC to conduct its doctrinal mission.

*Unit training.* Based on the information provided in the leaders' seminar, unit commanders design and implement their unit-training programs. This training is mission-focused and fully prepares the unit to accomplish its MOOTW missions. This training is conducted at home station to minimize personnel tempo. The one element missing after a unit completes this portion of training is bringing the leaders together to ensure the entire team is synchronized and mission-ready.

*Mission-rehearsal exercise (MRE).* The MRE—the capstone training event—completes the collective-training strategy for contingency operations. Units conduct MREs after completing general and theater-specific training. An MRE methodology is to determine the ground truth, identify staff focus, review sources, finalize story lines and develop consensus and validate story lines with the division. Senior-leader focus is on information briefs by subject matter experts, individual education, individual practical exercises and to train through integration on STX lanes and in the FTX.

Another key to an MRE is the joint air attack team (JAAT). A JAAT's objectives include synchronizing close air support, artillery and attack helicopter fires; validating the ability to plan, coordinate and deliver fires in a peace-enforcement environment; generating, disseminating and rehearsing fire support products and procedures; minimizing tactical risks through force protection measures

and certifying at least nine air mission commanders.<sup>1</sup>

**Step 5. Determine where to train.** The necessary time does not always exist to train to the level needed or desired by commanders. This shortfall is driving another paradigm shift. We are familiar with the concept of reception, staging, onward movement and integration (RSOI), which assumed that a trained force would enter the RSOI pipeline for employment. USAREUR/7A's experience highlights the need for considering a "T" (trained) component in the RSOI process. Sometimes the optimum location for training is not at home station and the best time is before deployment. Reserve Components

are accustomed to reception, staging, then training at their mobilization stations. This process is migrating to the Active Component as well.

**Step 6. Develop a reintegration plan.** Previous redeployments from mission placed full responsibility on each unit commander to develop a reintegration plan. While most commanders met the objectives of a swift reintegration, the planning duplicated work done by predecessors. To provide a structure to the reintegration plan, USAREUR/7A developed a measured, methodical and progressive 270-day reintegration program. This program includes sufficient time to reintegrate soldiers into individual, unit, collective, staff and

leader training programs and ensures soldiers receive time to rebuild their personal lives as well. The plan also minimizes theater disruption by seamlessly integrating the returning unit into ongoing theater training. *MR*

#### NOTES

1. US Department of the Army Field Manual 1-112, *Attack Helicopter Operations* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 02 April 1997).

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## In Search of NATO: The Regional Training Center—Bucharest

by Colonel Septimiu N. Caceu, Romanian Army  
and Lieutenant Colonel Robert J. Knight, British Army

Following its unsuccessful bid to join NATO in 1997, Romania asked the British government to help the Ministry of National Defence (MOND) disseminate NATO doctrine and procedures within the Romanian Army. The result was the establishment of the Bucharest Regional Training Centre (RTC).

The RTC is based within the Higher Military Academy in Bucharest and is directly under the command and control of the Romanian Curriculum Ladecizia Scolii. Since September 1997, many officers have attended the RTC. According to General Wesley Clark, the RTC has been a "most successful and courageous project."

The United Kingdom's (UK's) assistance is part of the British Defence Diplomacy Initiative's Outreach Programme. Having conducted preparatory work in England, a three-man British Army implementation team deployed to Bucharest on 25 August 1997 and joined a Romanian team led by Lieutenant Colonel Septimiu Caceu, the RTC's future chief. The RTC's overarching aim was to encourage a more flexible ethos and approach in the Romanian officer corps.

The RTC was soon a reality. Classrooms, administrative offices and the central lecture theater were

allocated, and the information technology and instructional equipment, purchased locally or funded by the British Ministry of Defence, was in place. Having identified course requirements, developed a suitable program and produced the detailed course content of lectures, presentations, discussion topics and exercises, three 4-week courses were run between September and December.

The UK implementation team initially conducted the courses, but by the third course the Romanian staff had assumed total responsibility for both instruction and administration. After the UK implementation team returned home, a permanent British liaison officer remained to provide:

- Advice and assistance to the RTC Romanian chief.
- Advice on course content, conduct and development.
- Liaison with UK agencies and organizations on the RTC's behalf.

The Romanian MOND placed considerable importance and priority on the RTC's success. The facilities are excellent and the staff, trained in the UK and the United States, are of extremely high quality and totally committed. The students, many of whom have already taken part in NATO exercises, peacekeeping missions under United Nations (UN)

mandates or attended courses overseas, are highly motivated, inquisitive and determined to acquire the knowledge and skills needed to work in a NATO environment.

At the RTC, English is the language of instruction, and all students must have attained English Level 3 prior to selection. At the RTC, they must also attend a 2-week English refresher course, concentrating on military terminology and oral briefing skills. Although the course is Army-oriented, the intent has always been to develop other single-service and joint courses once the initial course becomes firmly established and proven.

Vacancies on all courses are offered to other countries in the region. Romanian General Constantin Degeratu notified all other Central and Eastern European countries specifically to publicize the course and promote its value and success.

#### The Army Brigade Course

The Army Brigade Course's aim is to train selected officers in the UK approach to command, staff, operational and logistic procedures up to brigade level. Because this initiative is bilateral, it uses UK doctrine, principles and staff procedures as the basis for course content. This allows the course to be based on an existing UK course at the Army Junior

Division of the Joint Services Command and Staff College.

The Army Brigade Course consists of three classes of eight students. There are five courses per year. Up to 25 percent of the vacancies, approximately six in each course, are filled with students from outside Romania. Each course is six weeks long (eight weeks including language training). The longer course time allows the inclusion of material that had to be omitted from the original syllabus. Course content includes the following subjects:

- Doctrine.
- Command and staff procedures.
- Estimate/the decision-making process.
- Combat service support.
- Operations.
- Operations other than war.

The course focuses on general principles and procedures. It does not include specialized details relevant to individual Army branches.

Standard instructional methods used include:

- Preparatory reading. (Adequate time must be allocated as this too is all in English!)
- Central presentations.
- Syndicate (class) discussions.
- Practical exercises, if applicable.

Class discussions are considered to be a critical element in the learning process. By having a suitable mix of students in relation to rank, arm and appointment—current as well as past—in each class, students can share experiences, ideas and opinions in relation to the subject under discussion. Therefore, individuals will be better able to understand and appreciate the capabilities and limitations of the other elements of the Romanian Army, and better understanding will improve the Army's overall effectiveness during combined arms operations. The total course content includes:

- Central presentations: 20 percent.
- Syndicate (class) discussions: 32 percent.
- Practical exercises: 48 percent.

The significant percentage in favor of practical exercises reflects the need for students to practice newly acquired knowledge and skills. This

process has been particularly successful and is fully appreciated by students as well as the staff.

### Future Development

Based on the Army Brigade Course's success, the next stage in RTC's development has begun. The attendance of regional officers greatly enhances the RTC, making it truly regional and improving the Romanian officer corps' education and training.

The introduction of additional courses has also begun with consideration given to developing single-service courses for the Navy and Air Force. Currently, the priority is setting up a Joint Service Course, with emphasis on multinational operations. This will allow Romania to further develop its ability to deploy forces abroad in support of either UN or Partnership for Peace activities.

As of 1999, work was ongoing to identify another UK implementation team. Some members of the Joint Directing Staff had arrived, and others were to have arrived by September. The support staff was in place and working alongside those of the Army Brigade Course. The RTC was also tasked with providing short courses to meet specific demands.

Further developments are in many ways inextricably linked but vary in terms of the timeframe for implementation and complexity. The first is that of the wider dissemination of NATO doctrine and procedures. To a degree this is being done. Officers who have graduated will return to the field armed with newly acquired knowledge and will implement what they have learned.

There is also demand for the RTC staff to visit units and formations around the country to present specific subjects of value to a wider au-

dience. In addition, General Dumitru Cioflina intends to include an additional element within the 2-year syllabus of the Higher Military Studies Academy's Command and Staff Course based on what RTC teaches.

In the medium to long term, because the brigade course and the planned joint course are currently outside the present structure, career courses for Romanian officers will have to be reevaluated. While their structure is acceptable now, it might not be so in the future.

To date, the RTC has been an undoubted success; plans are now well advanced for its expansion. At completion, it will be truly regional. The RTC is trying to change an ethos and approach that has underpinned Romanian military thinking for the last 45 years. In this respect, staff procedures and how they are taught are merely tools to achieve that purpose. There is tremendous enthusiasm for this project to succeed, not only from those directly involved in running the RTC and the MOND but, more important, from the students. The RTC is a small but important catalyst for change within Romania's Armed Forces and shows exciting potential for the future. **MR**

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